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1957] RECENT DECISIONS 1197 
TORTS-GUEST ACT-NEGLIGENT CONDUCT OF THE DRIVER-Plaintiff was 
a gratuitous passenger in an automobile driven by defendant. Defendant, 
intending to coast to his destination, turned off the ignition, removed the 
key, and placed it in his pocket. The removal of the key caused the steer-
ing gear to lock, and defendant was unable to avoid a collision with a 
tree. Plaintiff suffered injuries and brought suit. Evidence was adduced 
to show that in defendant's type of automobile the steering wheel was so 
constructed as to lock upon removal of the key. Testimony revealed that 
defendant understood the general operation of the lock, but that the par-
ticular mechanism on his car had never worked previously. Even though 
the Indiana guest act bars recovery for injuries to a guest unless caused by 
"willful or wanton misconduct" of the driver, the trial court found defend-
ant liable. On appeal, held, reversed. The case was not a question for the 
jury. Wanton or reckless conduct, within the meaning of the Indiana 
guest act, means a conscious persistence in negligent conduct in the face of 
a known danger. Sausaman v. Leininger, (Ind. App. 1956) 137 N.E. (2d) 
547. 
Guest acts similar to that of Indiana are in effect in twenty-six states.1 
Their provisions immunize a negligent driver from liability for injury 
to gratuitous passengers riding in the defendant's automobile unless the 
injury has been caused by misconduct variously described as willful,2 
wanton,3 grossly negligent,4 reckless,5 or heedless.6 For the past thirty 
years judges have struggled to translate these epithets into a simple, useful 
statement of a standard of duty owing from the motorist to the passenger-
a standard which would enable the courts to determine under what cir-
cumstances a case should be submitted to the jury and, on the other hand, 
when it should be taken from the jury and decided, in favor of the defend-
ant, as a matter of law. A notable harmony among the state courts both 
as to approach and outcome has resulted, despite the variety of descrip-
1 Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Illinois, 
Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming. 
A twenty-seventh, Washington, has passed a statute which bars all recovery unless the 
injury is the result of the driver's "intentional" misconduct. 
2 Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Nevada, 
North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming. 
a Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Illinois, Kansas, 
Michigan, Ohio, South Dakota, Virginia, and Wyoming. 
4 Florida, Kansas, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, 
South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming. 
IS Idaho, Iowa, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, South Carolina, and Texas. 
6 New Mexico, South Carolina, and Texas. 
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tions of culpable negligence.7 The minimum duty is the following: after 
the host-motorist has actually discovered that there is danger in the manner 
in which his automobile is being driven, he must use reasonable care to 
get out of that position of danger. Put another way, a passenger must 
establish two facts before the judge will decide that the case should go to 
the jury: first, that defendant actually knew of a particular dangerous 
situation; and second, that defendant, in view of the emergency circum-
stances, did not exercise reasonable and prudent efforts to extricate his 
guest from the danger.s Evidence that the defendant had an actual 
knowledge of the peril may be shown by the fact that defendant actually 
observed the danger,9 or that he was given warning of it by his guests,10 
or by road signs,11 or by familiarity with the roadway12 or vehicle.13 The 
experience of a driver is a factor in establishing his knowledge of the 
danger. Inexperienced drivers, unused to the treachery of deep gravel or 
·1vermont and Virginia, in the construction of their guest acts, have adopted a more 
liberal rule for the guest than have the other states. Their "humanitarian" interpretation 
grants recovery for conduct not much removed from ordinary negligence. See Chamber-
lain v. Delphia, 118 Vt. 193, 103 A. (2d) 94 (1954) and Masters v. Cardi, 186 Va. 261, 42 
S.E. (2d) 203 (1947). 
s See Russell v. Turner, (N.D. Iowa 1944) 56 F. Supp. 455 (applying Iowa law), affd. 
(8th Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 562. See also Willett v. Smith, 260 Mich. 101, 244 N.W. 246 
(1932): Hottel v. Read, 66 Ohio App. 323, 33 N.E. (2d) 1011 (1940). 
9 A jury question: Blinn v. Hatton, 112 Mont. 219, 114 P. (2d) 518 (1941) (defendant 
tried to pass a weaving truck on a narrow road and was side-swiped); Froh v. Hein, 76 
N.D. 701, 39 N.W. (2d) 11 (1949) (defendant though enveloped in a dust cloud raised by 
preceding cars, did not slacken speed, struck an unlit car hidden by the dust); Jones v. 
Harris, 104 Cal. App. (2d) 347, 231 P. (2d) 561 (1951) (defendant struck car which he saw 
was in the oncoming car lane). A question not submissible to the jury: Schneider v. Parish, 
242 Iowa 1147, 49 N.W. (2d) 535 (1951) (motorcyclist and his passenger could not see a 
road fork nor the truck driver's signal that he was turning into the fork, tried to pass 
the truck, and were side-swiped). 
10 A jury question: Crowell v. Demo, 231 Iowa 228, 1 N.W. (2d) 93 (1941) (guest 
warned driver of an obstacle in the road); Scott v. Shairrick, 225 Ark. 59, 279 S.W. (2d) 
39 (1955) (protestation about defendant's inability to control car at speed he was driving). 
A question not submissible to the jury: Goetsch v. Matheson, 246 Iowa 800, 68 N.W. (2d) 
77 (1955); Gunderson v. Sopiwnik, 75 S.D. 402, 66 N.W. (2d) 510 (1954) (guests uttered no 
protest at the driver's conduct prior to the accident). 
11 A jury question: Jenkins v. Sharp, 140 Ohio St. 80, 42 N.E. (2d) 755 (1942) (de-
fendant attempted to shoot a stop sign); Clark v. Hicks, 127 Colo. 25,252 P. (2d) 1067 (1953) 
(defendant attempted to pass even though he saw a sign which said "Do Not Pass"). A 
question not submissible to the jury: Born v. Matzner's Estate, 159 Neb. 169, 65 N.W. (2d) 
593 (1954) (defendant did not see stop sign); Goodman v. Gonse, (Iowa 1956) 76 N.W. 
(2d) 873 (there was no curve sign on a deceptively sharp curve). 
12 A jury question: Nangle v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 96 Mont. 512, 32 P. (2d) 11 (1934) 
(defendant failed to negotiate familiar railway crossing). A question not submissible to the 
jury: Russell v. Turner, note 8 supra (defendant did not know road came to a dead end). 
13 A jury question: Bowman v. p·uckett, 144 Tex. 125, 188 S.W. (2d) 571 (1945) (driver 
knew brakes were defective). A question not submissible to the jury: In re Smoke's Estate, 
157 Neb. 152, 59 N.W. (2d) 184 (1953) (driver did not know of defect in the steering 
wheel). 
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ice, for example, will be relieved of liability,14 while an experienced 
motorist, under similar conditions, will be culpable.15 Any situation where 
injury is probable constitutes a danger.16 Driving in excess of the speed 
limit is not a danger, unless it is at such an extreme speed,17 or under 
such conditions,18 that the driver has but partial control of the vehicle. 
The degree of care required to avoid the danger varies directly with the 
time interval between the moment of knowledge of the danger and the 
accident. If the driver never was aware of the danger until the accident, no 
effort at all is required.19 Where the accident is inevitable when the defend-
ant apprehends his peril, the presence or absence of effort, be it completely 
ineffectual and futile, may well be the difference between a driver's in-
nocence or guilt.20 Timely knowledge of danger and persistence in spite 
of it is the aggravated kind of conduct which falls below the standard of 
duty required of a motorist.21 In the principal case, the Indiana court 
applied this standard. Its analysis turned on whether the defendant under-
stood the danger of his particular steering mechanism locking, and it con-
cluded that he was unaware that the previously defective lock would now 
work. Since he was without this actual knowledge, as a matter of law 
his conduct violated no duty to the plaintiff. In effect the courts have 
immunized what might be called unwitting negligence on the part of the 
driver. By inquiring into three particular facts- (1) defendant's subjective 
knowledge, (2) presence of danger, and (3) defendant's due care after 
apprehension of the danger-the courts have permitted liability to be 
affixed where the legislature would have it placed-upon the host with the 
"I-don't-care-what-happens" attitude.22 It also provides the passenger with 
14 Chemotik v. Schrank, (S.D. 1956) 79 N.W. (2d) 4 (young defendant lost control of 
car when he braked on gravel); Pettingell v. Moede, 129 Colo. 484, 271 P. (2d) 1038 (1954) 
(defendant lost control when his car slid on ice). 
15 Mel.one v. Bean, 263 Mich. 113, 248 N.W. 566 (1933) (defendant lost control of his 
car on a gravel road). 
16 See Russell v. Turner, note 8 supra. 
17 See Fritz v. Wohler, (Iowa 1956) 78 N.W. (2d) 27 (1956) (court said, in dicta, that 
up to 90 m.p.h was insufficient in itself to be a violation of a driver's duty to his guest). 
18 Shams v. Saportas, 152 Fla. 48, IO S. (2d) 715 (1942) (driving at extreme speed with 
smooth tires on a wet pavement was a violation of the driver's duty to his guest). 
19 Burrell v. Anderson, 133 Colo. 386, 295 P. (2d) 1039 (1956) (attention of driver 
distracted while he sought to adjust radio). Contra, Chamberlain v. Delphia, note 7 supra 
(defendant was lighting a cigarette and did not see oncoming car that was partially in 
defendant's lane. Jury verdict of grossly negligent conduct was affirmed). 
20A jury question: Koroma v. Kreifels, 144 Neb. 745, 14 N.W. (2d) 591 (1944) (driver 
did not apply his brakes after losing control). A question not submissible to the jury: 
Mason v. Mootz, 73 Idaho 461, 253 P. (2d) 240 (1953); Cunning v. Knott, 157 Neb. 170, 
59 N.W. (2d) 180 (1953) (defendant applied brakes in vain for 120 feet before hitting 
embankment at dead end of country road). 
21 Even though a breach of duty is established, it must be proved that the breach 
caused the accident. Splawn v. Wright, 198 Ark. 197, 128 S.W. (2d) 248 (1939) (danger was 
the likelihood of skidding on the slick pavement; accident was caused by the inattention 
of the driver who did not see the bridge abutment in time to apply the brakes). 
22 See McHugh v. Brown, (Del. 1956) 125 A. (2d) 583 at 586. 
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a modicum of control, for, whether or not the passenger has given timely 
warning of a specific danger may well detern).ine whether or not he will 
recover.23 This standard is not without its difficulties. Ascertainment of 
what a man knows, difficult at best, is a hopeless job if both driver and 
passenger have been killed in the accident.24 Also, since the test in-
volves subjective knowledge, it may make liable the cautious, less negli-
gent driver who is more perceptive to the dangers inherent in a situation, 
while the inattentive, even reckless, driver who never sees the trouble until 
the accident is inevitable may not be liable.2 5 So long as some states 
choose to limit a driver's liability to his passengers, however, to draw the 
line between unwitting and knowing negligence is to arrive at a predictable 
and generally not unsatisfactory result. 
William K. Muir, Jr. 
23 See note 10 supra. 
24 Contrast the different presumptions raised in two cases where the question of culpable 
negligence was submitted to the jury: Ferguson v. Hurford, 132 Colo. 507, 290 P. (2d) 229 
(1955) (court found circumstantially that the decedent defendant knew he lacked safe 
control of his car), and Orme v. Burr, 157 Fla. 378, 25 S. (2d} 870 (1946) (court held that 
since the plaintiff decedent was unable to prove actual knowledge of danger by defendant 
decedent, there should be no recovery). 
25 Compare English v. Jacobs, 263 Ala. 376, 82 S. (2d) 542 (1955) (a timid, inexperi• 
enced woman driver tried to negotiate a slippery country road after her guest had offered 
to drive if she was afraid; recovery granted when plaintiff was hurt when car slipped off the 
road), and Menkes v. Vance, 57 N.M. 456, 260 P. (2d) 368 (1953) (young college student 
drove extremely fast on unfamiliar country road, lost control of his car when he sought to 
avoid a mesquite bush; held, no recovery for injuries to his guest). 
